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Abstract
Background: Our motor actions normally generate sensory events, but how do we know which events were self generated
and which have external causes? Here we use temporal adaptation to investigate the processing stage and generality of our
sensorimotor timing estimates.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Adaptation to artificially-induced delays between action and event can produce a
startling percept—upon removal of the delay it feels as if the sensory event precedes its causative action. This temporal
recalibration of action and event occurs in a quantitatively similar manner across the sensory modalities. Critically, it is
robust to the replacement of one sense during the adaptation phase with another sense during the test judgment.
Conclusions/Significance: Our findings suggest a high-level, supramodal recalibration mechanism. The effects are well
described by a simple model which attempts to preserve the expected synchrony between action and event, but only when
causality indicates it is reasonable to do so. We further demonstrate that this model successfully characterises related
adaptation data from outside the sensorimotor domain.
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Introduction
Self-generated sensory stimuli will typically share a common
temporal register–their physical onset times will be closely
correlated with the moment in time when the causative motor
action is completed. For example, if we imagine the act of clicking
our fingers together, completing the motor action generates
instantaneous visual, tactile, and auditory sensory information.
Recently, Stetson et al. [1] demonstrated that the perceived timing
of the visuo-motor component of this action-event ensemble can
be markedly influenced by recent experience. Adaptation to a
fixed delay between a button press and ensuing visual flash induces
non-veridical perception of subsequent, physically simultaneous
button press-flash pairings: their reported temporal order is
reversed–‘I saw the flash before I pressed the button!’ - providing
empirical quantification of earlier, qualitative reports [2]. More
recent reports suggest that such effects can persist for at least 40
seconds in the absence of updated visual feedback [3]. This type of
temporal recalibration is reminiscent of the nervous system’s
response to spatial misalignment between seen and felt location
during prism adaptation experiments (e.g. [4]). It also has parallels
with purely sensory effects observed following adaptation to
audiovisual asynchrony [5–7]. Recently, Hanson et al. [8]
speculated that a single ‘supramodal’ mechanism may be
responsible for the recalibration of perceived time across sensory
pairings. Other behavioural studies provide support for this
concept. For example, despite absolute differences between
observers, within-observer differences in temporal sensitivity are
well correlated between perceptual and motor timing tasks [9–11].
Moreover, perceptual learning effects observed during interval
timing tasks are highly specific to the trained base interval yet
readily transfer between visual hemispheres [12], sensory modal-
ities [13], and perceptual to motor tasks [14,15]. These findings
imply that time itself–rather than the nature of the sensory or
motor information by which it is defined–may be the critical
perceptual parameter. Returning to the example of Stetson et al.’s
[1] visuo-motor effects, a single, late-stage timing mechanism
might be expected to recalibrate all the self generated sensory
consequences of motor actions in a similar manner [16].
Despite this, a host of recent studies have demonstrated that
visual stimuli such as that employed by Stetson et al. are subject to
perceptual distortions with seemingly low-level neural loci. For
example, simply reducing the visibility or increasing spatial
frequency of visual stimuli induces dramatic compressions in their
perceived duration [17]. Similar effects have been observed
following adaptation to drifting gratings [18,19], flickering patches
[19] or simply executing a saccadic eye movement [20].
Significantly, these adaptation effects have been shown to be
specific to the visual modality [19] and the region of visual space
occupied by the adapting stimulus [18,19]. In the auditory
domain, psychophysical interval timing data is successfully
predicted by a model whose temporal estimates are derived from
the spatiotemporal distribution of neural activity (or ‘state
dependent networks’) which could be performed at a range of
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neural processing scales [21]. This model is supported by a
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study showing that TMS
to visual cortical areas degrades visual (but not auditory) temporal
sensitivity [22]. Taken together, these findings are difficult to
reconcile with centralised clock models and point toward early,
peripheral timing mechanisms that are selective for modality and
low-level stimulus features.
Given this dichotomy in the literature, it is conceivable that the
nervous system could employ (i) a single, central, supramodal
mechanism charged with encoding all visuo-motor, auditory-
motor and tactile-motor temporal information, or (ii) each
sensorimotor domain could employ its own individual, peripheral
mechanism. Here we examine this issue by investigating the
interaction between sensorimotor timing, causality and the role of
recent experience across the sensory modalities.
Results
Observers adapted to a fixed delay (either 50, 100, 200, 400 or
800 ms) between the completion of their motor action (a
mousepress) and either visual (an LED ‘flash’), auditory (a white
noise ‘click’) or tactile (a ‘tap’ delivered to the opposite index
finger) feedback. Observers were instructed to press the mouse
button at intervals of their own choosing so as to ensure their
motor actions were entirely voluntary in nature [23,24]. Following
adaptation, observers were presented with a range of ‘test’ stimuli
in which their ‘test’ motor action (mousepress) was followed by
sensory feedback (from within the same modality as the adapting
stimuli) with a variable delay (25–125 ms). Observers made binary
forced choice temporal order judgments (TOJs) as to ‘which came
first, my mousepress or the flash/click/tap?’ (see ‘Materials and
Methods’ for details).
Figure 1A provides an example of the resultant psychometric
functions for the condition where observers adapted to delayed
audio-motor feedback following their motor actions. The percent-
age of ‘event before action’ responses is plotted against test delay.
Taking the example of the ‘200 ms’ adaptation data (green curve -
diamonds), it can be seen that at small test delays (e.g. 25 ms)
observers perceive an illusory reversal of temporal order: despite
physical delays between their motor actions and subsequent
sensory events, they report the action to follow the event. As test
delay increases, the perception of temporal order becomes more
veridical, with the percentage of ‘event before action’ responses
falling toward zero. The fact that these functions are laterally
displaced (relative to one another) shows that this effect is
dependent on the magnitude of the adapting delay. Specifically,
functions pertaining to the 50 ms condition (red curve - circles)
through to the 200 ms condition show a progressive rightward
shift in their mid-points. Larger adapting delays result in a
progressive reduction of illusory responses.
The midpoints of these functions represent the point of
subjective simultaneity (the physical temporal offset corresponding
to perceptual sensorimotor simultaneity or ‘PSS’). Their depen-
dence on adapting delay is illustrated in Figure 2 where the PSS
values have been extracted, averaged across observers and plotted
as a function of adapting delay. Inspection of Figure 2 shows that
adaptation to small delays between motor actions and their
associated visual (red circles), auditory (blue squares) or tactile
Figure 1. Temporal order and synchronous/asynchronous judgments after adaptation to sensorimotor delay. Raw data for
representative, naı¨ve observer KJW. (A) A sample of the psychometric functions generated via temporal order judgments: ‘which came first, action or
event?’. This sample shows unimodal data from the audio-motor section of the adaptation experiment. The percentage of ‘event before action’ trials
(i.e. where observers report an illusory reversal of temporal order) is plotted as a function of test delay (the physical asynchrony between their action
(a mousepress) and a sensory event (an auditory ‘click’ in this example)). The different coloured functions represent different sensorimotor adaptation
delays (see Figure key for details). (B) Data for the same observer for a control experiment. The only difference between the data shown in A&B is the
nature of the judgment type. In this data set, observers were presented with the same stimuli (‘mousepress-click’) but made synchronous/
asynchronous (as opposed to temporal order) judgements (see main text for details). The same Figure key applies to both panels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007681.g001
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(green diamonds) sensory feedback produces vigorous perceptual
recalibration of perceived sensorimotor time - observers require an
increasing physical delay between their mousepress and subsequent
sensory feedback in order to perceive perceptual sensorimotor
simultaneity. The magnitude of this recalibration appears to form
a fixed proportion of the adapting delay when the delay is below
,200 ms [5], beyond which a reduction in effect size is observed.
The significant effect of delay was confirmed by a repeated
measures analysis of variance (F4,16 = 37.1, p,0.001). The
difference between PSS values for each of the three senses just
reached significance (F2,8 = 5.57, p = 0.030) although there was no
significant interaction between delay and effect size (F8,32 = 1.30,
p.0.05).
Some consider that TOJs may be susceptible to response bias or
‘criterion-based’ artefacts that can shift PSS via strategic factors
that are likely to be of a cognitive, rather than perceptual nature
[25,26]. It could be argued that observers–subconsciously or
otherwise–adopted a strategy of distributing their TOJ responses
around some criterion other than their perceived arrival times.
This could have the effect of shifting the functions midpoint in the
opposite direction to the response bias. It has been suggested that a
‘synchronous/asynchronous’ judgment type is less susceptible to
this issue [26,27]. We therefore conducted a control experiment
where the audio-motor paradigm was revisited. The stimuli and
procedures were identical to those used in the previous experiment
with the exception that observers were now asked to make forced
choice judgments about whether their actions and subsequent
sensory feedback were synchronous or asynchronous. The data are
shown in Figure 1B alongside the psychometric functions for the
same representative, naı¨ve observer. Fitting these data with
Gaussian functions (see ‘Materials and Methods’ for details) allows
visualisation of how PSS (the function’s mean or ‘peak’ value)
varies with adapting delay. If our effects were peculiar to TOJs we
would expect the Gaussians to be superimposed on top of one
another with means centered around zero. This is clearly not the
case. Comparison with Figure 1A reveals that, despite some small
differences (e.g. in the 200 ms delay condition, the PSS shift is
slightly larger for synchronous/asynchronous judgements than for
TOJs), the overall pattern of results is strikingly similar: a
progressive rightward shift in the mean’s lateral position from
the 50–200 ms conditions with larger delays reversing the trend.
This finding suggests that our effects are relatively robust and
cannot be ascribed to idiosyncrasies in observer judgment type.
It should be stressed that our illusory effects in both the
temporal order and synchronous/asynchronous experiments were
quantifiable despite the absence of trials where where sensory
events physically preceded motor actions. Small to medium sized
delays resulted in large numbers of ‘event before action’ responses
across naı¨ve and non-naı¨ve observers. Indeed, naive observers
were extremely surprised to learn that no trials actually included a
sensory stimulus prior to their motor response. This highlights the
robustness of the effect which has now been demonstrated using a
number of different experimental paradigms [1–3].
Returning to the data shown in Figure 2, it seems that
combinations of factors are contributing to the magnitude of our
adaptation effects. One is the lifelong experience that motor
actions and sensory events tend to be closely associated in time.
When presented with a temporal asynchrony between action and
event (both of which possess temporal uncertainty), a likely
inference is that this asynchrony is the result of neural error
indicating the need for re-calibration. This could either be
achieved by realigning the noisy sensory estimate of delay toward
a ‘synchrony prior’ [28], changing the synchrony prior in the light
of adaptation [29,30] or manipulating the Bayesian combination
of both with an additional noisy estimate based on current context
[31]. This type of sensory realignment appears in many different
forms, but Helson’s Adaptation Level Theory [32] underlies all of
them. This theory proposes that the current, adapted state
provides a sensory standard against which new stimuli are
perceived. The result is that, in trials where the adapting stimulus
is suddenly removed (‘catch’ trials), significant ‘rebound’ judgment
errors result. Motor adaptation is commonly studied in this way,
with the general finding that the extent of adaptation is
proportional to the motor disturbance introduced. In the context
of our adaptation effects, this would suggest that temporal
recalibration should increase linearly with adapting delay. This
is not the case (Figure 2), and brings us on to the second factor
determining our effects.
In the motor domain, it has recently become evident that the
relevance or ‘credibility’ of disturbing forces affecting motor actions
are taken into consideration before making adaptive changes
[33,34]. Similarly, in the sensorimotor domain, human observers
typically show a rapid fall-off in their tendency to attribute sensory
feedback as being a consequence of their motor actions as the
temporal discrepancy between the two is increased [35–38].
The concept of causality appears to be critical [39], with
Haggard et al [40] finding that the perceived times of motor
actions and events are indeed attracted towards each other in time,
but that this effect dissipates rapidly with the physical delay
between the two. Inspection of Haggard’s data reveals that the rate
of decline is well described by an exponential function [40]. We
therefore suggest that our adaptation effects decrease at long
delays because observers no longer consider the sensory event to
be a direct consequence of their action.
On this basis, we model our data as a combination of two
factors–a linear increase in temporal recalibration which is
Figure 2. Adaption shifts the point of subjective sensorimotor
simultaneity across the sensorimotor pairings. Temporal recali-
bration of motor action and a sensory event in the visual (red circles),
auditory (blue squares) and tactile (green diamonds) sensorimotor
pairings. Data points represent the physical sensorimotor asynchrony
necessary to produce perceptual synchrony (PSS). Positive values signify
a temporal lead of action over event. The data are fitted with a model
with two free parameters (see main text for details). Error bars represent
one standard error of the mean (variance between observers) either
side of the parameter values (n = 5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007681.g002
Effect before Cause
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 November 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 11 | e7681
proportional to the delay, combined with an exponential reduction
in the tendency to attribute action and event as being associated.
The data of Figure 2 are therefore fitted with the function
PSS~k|delay|e
{
delay
k0
 
where k is a constant of proportionality and k’ determines the rate
of exponential decay.
This provides an excellent fit to the data sets for each sense.
Parameter values along with their errors and goodness-of-fit are
given in Table 1. The proximity to unity of the parameter k, for all
three senses, indicates that temporal recalibration is virtually
complete at small delays. Observers fully adapt to the delay and
recalibrate their sense of synchrony accordingly.
Whilst the visuo-motor data corroborates the recent data of
Stetson et al. [1], the auditory and tactile data form the first
demonstration of adaptive temporal realignment of audio-motor
and tactile-motor perception. The most striking feature of the data
shown in Figure 2 is the similarity in the pattern of results across
the three sensorimotor domains. A potential explanation for
equivalence between the modalities is a single perceptual
mechanism that recalibrates all the sensory consequences of a
given motor action. If the recalibration mechanism is manifest at a
sufficiently late-stage of temporal processing (e.g., beyond
modality-specific cortical areas) the recalibration effects shown in
Figures 1 & 2 should survive the replacement of the sensory
component between adapt and test phases. To address this
question we performed a further, similar experiment where
observers adapted to a fixed 200 ms delay (where the adaptation
effects shown in Figure 2 appear maximal) in one sensorimotor
pairing but their post-adaptation sensorimotor TOJs were tested
with a different sensorimotor pairing (e.g., adapt ‘mousepress-
flash’, test ‘mousepress-click’) (see ‘Materials and Methods’ for
details).
Figure 3 shows the average PSS values extracted from the
resultant crossmodal psychometric functions (Fig. 3 - grey bars),
alongside the within-modality 200 ms values from Figure 2 (Fig. 3
- yellow bars). It is clear that the recalibration effects are unaffected
by the changeover of the sensory component between adaptation
and test phases. The similarity between the effect size across
conditions is confirmed by two-way repeated measures ANOVA,
which revealed that the effect of test modality on PSS was
significant (F2, 12 = 7.41, p = 0.008), but that the effect of the
adapting modality was not significant (F2, 12 = 1.61, p.0.05). The
former reflects the fact that the magnitude of the effect was slightly,
but consistently, higher for the ‘test A’ condition (Figure 3B).
Critically, however, there was no significant interaction between
these two factors (F4, 24 = 2.02, p.0.05). In other words, the
magnitude of the effect for a given test modality does not depend
on the adapting modality. Thus, adaptation to delayed sensory
consequences recalibrates all the sensory consequences of the
motor action employed in the current study.
Thus far, we have considered changes in perceived temporal
alignment (PSS), as opposed to the sensitivity to changes in relative
temporal position. In the first, within-modality experiment,
sensorimotor temporal order thresholds were not dependent on
test stimulus modality (F2, 8 = 1.23, p.0.05). In the crossmodal
‘200 ms’ condition, threshold values were not dependent on test
modality or adapting modality per se (F2, 12 = 0.712, p.0.05), but
the interaction between adapt and test modalities was significant
(F4, 24 = 9.815, p = 0.0001). Figure 4 shows this arises from the
notable cost to performance when the modality of the sensory
event changes between adapt and test phases. This is in keeping
with studies showing that temporal performance is compromised
by rapid switching of attention between the sensory modalities
(e.g., [12,41]).
Discussion
In the current study we set out to investigate how recent
experience influences the nervous system’s estimates of sensori-
motor timing across the sensory modalities. The data from the first
experiment clearly show that the visual, auditory and tactile
Table 1.
Sense k k’ (msec) R2
Vision 0.83160.053 264614 0.971
Audition 0.98460.042 24268 0.983
Touch 0.83660.048 231611 0.973
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007681.t001
Figure 3. Temporal recalibration transfers to un-adapted sensorimotor pairings. Average PSS values (ms) from (A) visuo-motor (V), (B)
auditory-motor (A) and (c) tactile-motor (T) sensorimotor temporal order judgments following adaptation to a 200 ms delay between action and
event. Positive values signify a temporal lead of action over event. Yellow bars represent within-modality data taken from the 200 ms condition in
Figure 2. Grey bars represent the crossmodal conditions for the same delay. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean either side of the
parameter values (n = 7).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007681.g003
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sensory consequences of our motor actions are all subject to
marked temporal recalibration when presented with consistent
temporal delays. The results of the final, crossmodal experiment
reveal that this recalibration transfers to sensorimotor pairings
other than those included in the adaptation phase. Our data are
well described by a model in which an observer’s prior experience
leads them to impose perceptual synchrony between motor actions
and their sensory consequences. One intuitively appealing feature
of this model is that it balances the costs and benefits of
recalibrating perception in response to an altered physical
environment. Small sensorimotor temporal delays are treated as
improbable, and the perceived sensorimotor timing of all potential
sensory feedback is almost completely realigned. Increasing delays
between actions and afferent sensory inputs are classified as
exponentially more likely to have arisen from independent causes
(i.e., external agencies), thus minimising the risk of erroneous
adaptation.
Elements of our model have parallels with two concepts from
the causality literature. Firstly, the notion of an ‘internal
comparison process’ first postulated by Helmholtz (for a recent
review see [42]). Here, observers compute the difference between
the predicted and perceived afferent sensory feedback following
completion of their motor commands (e.g., a saccade [43] or
contact between fingers [44]). The output of this ‘comparator
model’ gives a metric of causality, and it could be argued that our
observers use such an output to recalibrate sensorimotor time. For
example, Bays et al [35] discuss a general principal of how
prediction is employed in a variety of situations such as tactile
force perception. Tactile sensation is typically attenuated when it is
associated with self-generated actions [35,45]. Interestingly, this
attenuation can occur without the full completion of the action,
presumably because the nervous system makes prior assumptions
about the sensory consequences [44]. Secondly, an assumption of
synchrony also has implications for the nature of ‘intentional
binding’ effects described by Haggard and colleagues, in which
observers consistently underestimate the temporal interval be-
tween voluntary actions and their sensory consequences (e.g.,
[40,46]). This underestimation can be thought of as either (i) a
local compression of the temporal interval between action and
event or, (ii) a temporal realignment (i.e. recalibration) of the
signals binding the interval [1]. Our adaptation data favour the
latter explanation because after-effects of intentional binding
brought about by interval compression do not predict the illusory
reversal of temporal order observed here. Our effects strongly
suggest that the signals themselves are realigned rather than the
perception of the interval between them. In the context of the
current study, it remains unknown whether such recalibration
involves a forward shift in time of sensory feedback or a backward
shift of the motor action or, indeed, a combination of the two.
It seems logical to speculate whether the notion of an
assumption of synchrony is limited to the perception of
sensorimotor timing. Whilst an afferent self-generated sensory
signal must be generated simultaneously with the completion of
the causative motor action, audio-visual signals arising from a
proximal external source - but independently of our motor actions
- are also likely to share a correlated temporal register [47]. We
applied the model described above to the audio-visual data of
Fujisaki et al. [7], where audio-visual PSS was systematically
mapped-out as a function of the magnitude of the adapting
asynchrony. These data are shown in Figure 5. Clearly, Fujisaki et
al’s audiovisual effects are well described by this model
(R2 = 0.943). Whilst the optimum exponent for this data set was
similar to that found for our sensorimotor data (291649 msec), a
much smaller constant of proportionality is present (0.2560.05).
The smaller constant of proportionality perhaps suggests a weaker
assumption of synchrony for sensory-sensory stimuli than for
sensorimotor stimuli. Whilst the seen and heard components of
audio-visual events will be generated simultaneously, they
regularly arrive at their receptor surfaces with significant physical
asynchrony (e.g. when observer-event distance is relatively large
[5]). This provides an interesting avenue for future work. Audio-
tactile and visuo-tactile signals are not subject to the significant
environmental delays affecting their audiovisual counterparts. If
long-term experience of this relationship drives a stronger
assumption of synchrony between the signals, we would expect
differences in the relationship between the extent of the
recalibration and adapting asynchrony (e.g. Fig. 5) across the
different multisensory pairings.
The nature of our adaptation effects is likely to have
implications for their neural locus. The twin findings that (i) in
terms of amplitude and tuning, all three sensorimotor pairings are
recalibrated in a very similar manner and (ii) the illusion transfers
to un-adapted sensorimotor pairings, strongly suggests that our
effects are mediated at a relatively late-stage in the sensory and/or
Figure 4. Sensitivity to changes in relative sensorimotor time. Average threshold values (ms) from (A) visuo-motor, (B) audio-motor and (C)
tactile-motor sensorimotor temporal order judgments following adaptation to a 200 ms delay between action and event. In each plot, yellow bars
represent within-modality data taken from the 200 ms condition in Figure 2. Grey bars represent crossmodal data (e.g., adapt visuo-motor, test audio-
motor). Error bars represent one standard error of the mean either side of the parameter values (n = 7).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007681.g004
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motor processing hierarchy. It seems reasonable to assume that the
neural architecture subserving these effects is most likely located
beyond the level of modality-specific brain areas [16].
In summary, our data suggest that temporal recalibration occurs
because actions and their sensory consequences ‘should’ feel
synchronous [48]. When this a priori assumption about the external
world is combined with noisy sensorimotor estimates, adaptation
initiates a realignment of our perception away from veridicality
and toward the temporal relationship experienced during
adaptation. Importantly, this only occurs when the nervous system
can be confident that sensory inputs are a product of its own motor
commands. Temporal discrepancies between motor actions and
sensory events have been shown to be a powerful metric in the
perception of causality [35,36,49] and the strength of this
association declines exponentially with time [40]. This makes
sense if the nervous system seeks to avoid potentially dangerous
recalibration between our motor actions and sensory events with
independent, external causes. An interesting direction for future
work would be to use our paradigm to probe sensorimotor
recalibration in schizophrenic patients with delusions of control.
The work of two recent studies suggests that the temporal tuning of
our effects (Fig. 2) may be considerably more narrow as a result of
their tendency to attribute external causalities to internally generated
stimuli [43,45]. By the same token, it would be of interest to
examine whether adaptive sensorimotor recalibration occurs when
observers attempt to interpret actions and sensory consequences,
but where the actions are generated by external agencies [24,44].
Materials and Methods
Observers
Five trained observers (3 authors plus 2 naı¨ve) participated in
the within-modality experiments, whereas seven trained observers
(3 authors, plus 4 naı¨ve) participated in the crossmodal
experiment. All experiments were run with the permission of
The University of Bradford’s ethics committee after gaining
informed, written consent from all observers (in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki).
Stimuli
Visual stimulation was provided by a small (1.05u diameter)
green LED (luminous intensity 600 cd/m2), auditory stimulation
by a white noise burst (70 dB SPL), and tactile stimulation by a tap
on the left forefinger delivered via an electrical solenoid. All stimuli
were contained within 10 ms square wave-windowed temporal
profiles. The relative timings of motor action and sensory stimuli
were verified by simultaneous capture on a multiple trace
oscilloscope. Auditory stimuli were delivered binaurally via tightly
fitting, pinna-enclosing headphones (Sennheiser HD650). These
headphones were worn by all observers for all experiments
ensuring that the operational noise of the mousepress (see below)
and solenoid remained inaudible to observers. The generation and
presentation of all stimuli was controlled via custom-written
software run in MatLab (Mathworks, U.S.A.) via a desktop PC.
Procedures
During the experiment, observers were instructed to fixate the
centre of the LED and press the mouse button at a pace of their
own choosing. After each of the first four mousepresses, a stimulus
was presented (‘flash’, ‘click’ or ‘tap’) at a constant delay of either
25, 50, 100, 200, 400 or 800 ms (‘adapting’ presentations). For all
experiments this delay was consistent during a given experimental
run. After the fifth mousepress, the same stimulus was presented
with a delay of 25, 50, 75, 100, or 125 ms, which varied randomly
within a method of constant stimuli (‘test’ presentation). Observers
were required to judge whether the fifth stimulus presentation
appeared before or after the fifth buttonpress, and make an
unspeeded, binary forced-choice response via a computer
keyboard. This response initiated the next cycle of adapting and
test stimuli. Each of the five test delays was tested 10 times within
an experimental run. Observers completed five runs for each of
the three sensorimotor pairings tested, making a total of 750 test
presentations per observer (10 presentations* 5 runs* 5 test delays
* 3 sensorimotor pairings). The order of these runs was
randomised so that each 10 repetition run was equally likely to
contain any of the five different adapting delays.
The resultant psychometric functions (Fig. 1A) were fitted with a
logistic function of the form
y~
100
1ze{
x{uð Þ
h
where m is the sensorimotor asynchrony value corresponding to the
PSS (the 50% response level on the psychometric function), and h
provides an estimate of temporal order threshold (approximately
half the offset between the 27% and 73% response levels). In this
way, PSS values were obtained for all observers in all of the
conditions (Fig. 2).
The second, control experiment was identical to the audio-
motor section of first experiment with the exception that observers
changed their judgment type from ‘which came first, action or
event?’ to ‘were action and event synchronous or asynchronous?’
The resultant data were fitted with Gaussian functions (Fig. 1B) of
the form
y~k|e
{
x{uð Þ2
2s2
Figure 5. Adaptation to purely sensory asynchrony. Data taken
from Fujisaki at al. (2004) where observers adapted to a fixed level of
asynchrony between auditory and visual stimulus pairs before judging
the relative temporal relationship of audiovisual test pairs [7]. PSS
values are plotted as a function of the size of the adapting asynchrony
and are expressed relative to the ‘adapt synchronous’ condition. The
data are fitted with a same model used to fit the sensorimotor data
shown in Figure 2 (see main text for details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007681.g005
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where m is the sensorimotor asynchrony value corresponding to the
PSS (the peak of the Gaussian function), s provides an estimate of
sensitivity to asynchrony (the width of the function) and k is a
constant that reflects the amplitude of the function.
The final, crossmodal experiment was identical to the TOJ
version of the initial within-modality experiment with two
exceptions: (i) the adapting and test modalities differed, giving
rise to six crossmodal conditions and, (ii) only the 200 ms
adaptation delay condition was tested for each of these conditions
(adapt V test A, adapt V test T, adapt A test V, adapt A test T,
adapt T test V, and adapt T test A). The PSS and threshold values
from these conditions are shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively.
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